INTRODUCTION
The belief that smallpox is one of the more contagious infectious diseases (1, 2) has often resulted in systematic nation-wide vaccination campaigns to increase immunity in all geographic areas, whether or not the area is infected with smallpox. Many eradication programs in the past were planned solely on the basis of population characteristics and neglected the distribution of smallpox within the population. Eradication programs were equated with mass vaccination programs. As recently as 1964, a World Health Organization Expert Committee stated "the target must be to cover 100 per cent of the population" (3). An epidemiologic approach based specifi- ' From the Smallpox Eradication Program, Center for Disease Control, Atlanta, Georgia 30333.
"Director, Smallpox Eradication Program, Center for Disease Control, Atlanta, Georgia 30333. 3 Director, State and Community Services Division, Center for Disease Control, Atlanta, Georgia 30333.
'Assistant to the Director, State and Community Services Division, Center for Disease Control, Atlanta, Georgia 30333. cally on interrupting transmission had received little attention in endemic countries.
Recent field observations have demonstrated that smallpox is not one of the more contagious diseases. Infected persons rarely transmit the disease to an average of more than two or three persons and most transmission occurs within the infected household. In addition, smallpox typically involves only a small percentage of villages at a given time. Examination of a smallpox endemic district in India revealed that at no time were more than 1 per cent of the villages (20 of 2331) involved with smallpox, and at the lowest point only seven villages (0.3 per cent) had cases of smallpox present (4) . The slow development of outbreaks and the clustering of outbreaks indicate that an epidemiologic approach to interrupting transmission might have particular merit. Finally, the seasonal occurrence of smallpox is such that, at certain times of the year, during the period of low incidence, the interruption of transmission should be most readily accomplished.
In A decision was made to undertake epidemiologic control activities as a priority measure even if mass vaccination efforts were reduced. In early September 1968, epidemiologic control activities were coordinated in eight nations (Nigeria, Togo, Dahomey, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger, Guinea, and Sierra Leone), all of the countries in the 20-country region which were infected with smallpox. A neologic term, "eradication escalation", was used to identify these activities and is used in this report because to persons involved in the West and Central Africa Smallpox Eradication Program it became synonymous with a set of methods.
METHODS
Four principal methods were employed during the eradication escalation effort: active surveillance, outbreak investigation, outbreak control, and rapid communication of disease intelligence.
Surveillance
Participating countries employed a variety of techniques to locate smallpox cases. The usual disease-reporting system was utilized as a method for determining where control teams should work. Since this approach requires waiting for reports of smallpox, it constitutes a passive surveillance system. In addition, active surveillance techniques were used, here defined as attempts to find smallpox cases not reported through the usual system. Newspapers, radio, and letters were used to alert the public and solicit information about smallpox cases. Widely dispersed informal surveillance systems were developed through the cooperation of other health services (malaria, leprosy), other government personnel (teachers, rural mail carriers, agricultural project personnel), local authority figures (village and area chiefs), and volunteer agencies, such as missions. Several countries instituted special active surveillance projects in areas suspected to have smallpox. Visits by project personnel were made to each village leader in the suspicious area or exhaustive house-to-house searches were performed to locate patients and immunize unvaccinated persons.
Outbreak investigation
Vigorous attempts were made to locate all sources of smallpox infection. Reported cases were promptly investigated, the full extent of each outbreak was delineated, and the target area for epidemic control efforts was defined. This area included villages, markets, and compounds which were contiguous with the infected village, or which received frequent visitors from the infected village. The events which produced the outbreak were established and, insofar as it was possible, the chain of infection was traced to determine the source of the original case. Laboratory specimens were collected to verify the diagnosis of smallpox.
Outbreak control
Various outbreak control techniques were used. The objective was to vaccinate a geographically or sociologically contiguous "area" around each patient. The extent of this area was determined by the outbreak investigation. The approach is intermediate between selective vaccination of close per- sonal contacts (practiced to control imported smallpox in many non-endemic countries) and the indiscriminant mass vaccination campaigns which must be performed in the absence of adequate outbreak investigation.
Communications
Unofficial weekly telegraphic reports were sent to the Smallpox Eradication Program headquarters at the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta and to its Regional Office in Lagos, Nigeria, to facilitate rapid communication of smallpox information. The cables reported the weekly number of smallpox cases, their geographic location, and the status of control activities. These data were circulated in an informal weekly report and distributed to the involved countries, enabling health officials to take rapid preventive measures or to intensify active surveillance activities when outbreaks threatened their borders.
RESULTS

Smallpox incidence
The 1968 monthly smallpox reports were consistently below the corresponding monthly mean for 1960-1967 (figure 1). The decline of reported cases from May through August 1968 was reversed in Sep- tember, reflecting the intensified surveillance activities which identified many cases not ordinarily detected by the official reporting network. Reports decreased in November and continued to decline in early 1969, despite improvement in disease reporting. The usual dry season epidemic did Figure 2 compares the decline of smallpox cases with the decline in smallpox susceptibles as the result of mass vaccination. Susceptibles are defined as individuals who had not been vaccinated since the inception of the program; smallpox cases are expressed as the ratio of cases reported by month in 1968-1969 to the monthly average of reported cases during 1960-1967. After October 1968, smallpox declined much more rapidly than did the number of smallpox susceptibles, undoubtedly due to the eradication escalation activities.
In Sierra Leone, with the highest smallpox rates in the world in 1968, only 66 per cent of the population had been vaccinated by May 1969, when smallpox disappeared from the country. In Mali, 51 per cent of the population had been vaccinated by February 1969 when smallpox disappeared.
Surveillance
The institution of active surveillance enabled countries to accurately assess the level of actual smallpox incidence, define endemic foci, and improve the effectiveness of control activities. Table 1 shows the influence of active surveillance activities on reported smallpox cases. During the first six months of 1968, less than 5 per cent of known smallpox cases were detected by active surveillance techniques. By contrast, between 57 and 67 per cent of all cases reported by these countries between October 1968 and January 1969 were detected by active surveillance procedures.
Outbreak investigations
A major factor in the success of the eradication escalation strategy was the prompt and intensive response to each outbreak. A smallpox outbreak is defined as one or more cases occurring in an area previously free of smallpox, or cases occurring in smallpox-infected areas which are epiderniologically related. In 1968 and 1969 marked improvement occurred in the response to reported outbreaks. Table 2 indicates a steady improvement in the percentage of reported outbreaks which were investigated. In 1969 all outbreaks were investigated.
Effect of eradication escalation on the mass vaccination campaign
Because of the emphasis placed on the eradication escalation activities and the diversion of vaccinators and supervisors from the mass vaccination campaign, it was feared initially that ongoing vaccination activities would be crippled. Table 3 demonstrates that the converse was true. Investigation and control activities diverted only a small proportion of project personnel to outbreak control activities. The participating countries frequently acquired shortterm personnel to augment the program during the initial critical months.
DISCUSSION
Mass vaccination campaigns in themselves are often inadequate to eradicate smallpox (5) . Smallpox eradication programs have resulted in vaccination numbers exceeding the estimated population, and yet smallpox remained endemic.
Dixon, while dismissing the notion that smallpox eradication can be achieved by vaccinating 80 per cent of the population within four or five years, points out that "if more study were given to the foci of smallpox, it might be possible to eradicate the disease from an area by vaccinating a far smaller proportion of the total population" (6) .
Epidemiologic control methods were advocated over a century ago in England, when it was clear that mass vaccination methods were not eliminating smallpox. In 1896, the Royal Commission pointed out the need for "a complete system of notification" to diminish the prevalence of smallpox (7). Despite repeated references in the literature, the practical concept of surveillance and epidemiologic control has developed slowly and has thus far had greatest application in non-endemic countries attempting to detect and eliminate importations.
The use of these techniques in smallpox endemic countries is a logical extension if endemic countries are viewed as non-endemic areas with "islands" of endemicity, each equivalent to an importation. Removal of the islands is reasonable at any time, but particularly crucial at the seasonal trough period when the fewest islands exist.
"Selective epidemiological control" (8) has been successful in West and Central Africa. Intelligent use of vaccination based on knowledge of where the disease is and when, where and to whom the disease is likely to spread is more economical in time, vaccine, and personnel than blind mass vaccination. Mass vaccination campaigns should continue in endemic areas, but we consider the use of surveillance, investigation, and selective epidemiologic control techniques to be of equal and, under certain circumstances, of even greater importance than systematic mass vaccination activities.
